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Condorcet.vote Alpha
EN
Tools · Independent of any election

Prove — or verify — a vote

After an election closes, a voter can, at their sole initiative, prove to a third party that a published ballot is theirs — for example under a mandate or a proxy arrangement. Everything happens in your browser, using the information from your vote receipt. No account, nothing is sent: your secret key never leaves this device.

Read this before using these tools

Proving means revealing. Generating a proof publicly shows how you voted — your ballot is no longer secret to whoever receives it.

The proof is transferable. Whoever receives it can in turn convince anyone else: it is not restricted to the original requester.

Strictly voluntary. No one — not the organizer, not a third party — can force you to produce a proof.

Secret key stays local. It is used only in this browser and is never transmitted or stored.

How the steps fit together
1
Requester
generates a nonce
2
Voter
produces the proof
3
Requester
verifies the proof
Step 1 · The requester

Generate a challenge (nonce)

Create a nonce — a single-use random string — and give it to the voter. It is what prevents an old proof from being reused. Generate a new one for every request.

Step 2 · The voter

Prove my vote

Using your receipt, produce a proof block to hand to the requester. Everything is computed locally.

Generating a proof reveals how you voted and it remains transferable. Do it only if it is your own decision.

Load your .condorcet_receipt file: the key, the election and the key image are filled in automatically.

Sensitive area · secret key
It never leaves this browser and is neither stored nor pre-filled.
It appears on your receipt (key_image field).
Step 3 · The requester — or anyone

Verify a proof

Paste the block received from the voter. The tool verifies the proof cryptographically.

Standalone page, running entirely in your browser. No third-party scripts, no analytics, no data transmitted.